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Introduction 
On December 31, 2015, China elevated the status and stature of its 
nuclear and missile forces by making the People’s Liberation Army 
Rocket Force (PLARF) a fourth military Service alongside the Army, 
Navy and Air Force. Since then, the pronouncements and directions of 
Chinese President Xi Jinping and press releases have bolstered and further 
enhanced the importance that China attaches to its PLARF. 
Owing to China’s increasing attention on the PLARF, it becomes 
imperative to understand the Chinese approach to the modernisation of 
the PLARF and its future role. The pertinent query lies in understanding 
of how this capability will be instrumental in actualising China’s role in 
the future. Keeping this context, the assessments will be drawn from a 
context and content analysis of the official papers and documents of press 
releases to determine if there is a genuine commitment to the official 
word or there is an asymmetry in the theory and practice. In doing so, the 
paper seeks to examine two key issues: first, application of the proposed 
thoughts and ideas; and second, evaluation of the consonance between 
professing and practice.
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The Duality in China’s Approach: Professing Versus Practice
The 2015 White Paper on China’s Military Strategy stated: “China 
will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an 
independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is 
defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, 
and will never seek hegemony or expansion. China’s armed forces will 
remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace”.1 However, Chinese 
actions, as witnessed in its artificial island build-up activities in the South 
China Sea, rejection of the ruling by the International Court of Justice 
which was against China, unilateral establishment of the Air Defence 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, support to North 
Korea, the Doklam intrusion into Bhutanese territory and others run 
contrary to its own propositions, as noted in the above White Paper. On 
the contrary, these actions exemplify China’s non-conformist attitude, 
further suggesting that as China grows more powerful, it will become 
more unpredictable in its behaviour and approach. This asymmetry in 
theory and practice reflects the duality in the Chinese approach. This 
can be further assessed under a thematic perspective, as evident from the 
2015 White Paper.
With respect to the application of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA), the White Paper notes: “The world Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range, precise, smart, 
stealthy and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated. Outer space and cyber space have become new commanding 
heights in strategic competition among all parties. The form of war is 
accelerating its evolution to informationization”.2 China has emphasised 
on the shift towards informationised warfare, and, in the past two decades, 
and more so, in the last five years, China has also made strident progress 
in the development and deployment of the strategy of “dual deterrence 
and dual operations” enunciated by Jiang Zemin post the first Gulf War. 
China learnt important lessons from the Gulf War on the use of precision 
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and guided weapons, standoff capability of weapon platforms and the 
power of network-centric warfare synergised by satellites. China has made 
a concerted effort to improve the capability of the PLARF by the induction 
of new technologically advanced missiles and technical enhancement of the 
existing missiles which has improved its precision strike and manoeuvrability 
of missiles. To enable the informationised (network-centric operations), 
China has focussed on growth in the space and cyber domains. The RMA 
effect on the PLARF and space capabilities will be examined later.
On the missions of the PLA, the White Paper states, “China’s armed 
forces mainly shoulder the following strategic tasks: To deal with a wide 
range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard 
the sovereignty and security of China’s territorial land, air and sea. To 
resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland. To safeguard 
China’s security and interests in new domains.To safeguard the security of 
China’s overseas interests. To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out 
nuclear counterattack. To participate in regional and international security 
cooperation and maintain regional and world peace”.3 In comparison to 
the past papers, this one exhibits a new departure as the scope of China’s 
threat perception is broadened and there is an emphasis on China’s larger 
role in the international order. This is indicative of China’s growing interest 
as well as the possibility of its playing a role beyond the Chinese borders. 
Such behaviour can be played out by active or forced participation in 
maintaining peace outside China, addressing military threats proactively, 
or even preemptive action, and development of new military capabilities in 
the emerging domains, specifically, space and cyber. In view of this, the way 
China defines its overseas interests is driven by its own interpretation that 
serves its own interest. This further indicates an increase in China’s muscle 
flexing behaviour, thus, calling for great power competition.
The concept of ‘active defence’ needs analysis, which as the White 
Paper posits “is the essence of the CPC’s military strategic thought. From 
the long-term practice of revolutionary wars, the people’s armed forces 
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have developed a complete set of strategic concepts of active defense, which 
boils down to: adherence to the unity of strategic defense and operational 
and tactical offense”.4 To note, the initial term is defined as “unity of 
strategic defense”, while, the second half is defined as that of “operational 
and tactical offense”. The counter-attack actions in such a situation will 
result in preemptive actions to stall an offensive by the opponent. This 
reflects a dichotomy: if the operational and tactical aspects are offensive 
in nature, then it remains indisputable that the overall strategy cannot 
be defensive, as stated above. In view of this, all Chinese actions in war 
and peace should be regarded as offensive, as perceiving these otherwise 
results in a faulty assessment. This is evident in terms of China’s behaviour 
towards India, as witnessed in the 1950s, 1962 or 1967, the episodes of 
transgressions in the past decade and, most recently, the Doklam standoff 
in 2017: all these clarify the duality in the Chinese interpretation of their 
strategy. To justify its offensive actions and intent, China portrays itself as 
the wronged party, even distorting historical facts to legitimise its claims. 
China has transformed its strategic outlook from “winning local wars 
in conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology” in 1993 
to that of “winning local wars under conditions of informationization” 
in 2004 to that of “winning informationized local wars” in 2015. As the 
White Paper mentions, “[t]o implement the military strategic guideline 
of active defense in the new situation, China’s armed forces will adjust the 
basic point for [Preparation for Military Struggle] PMS. In line with the 
evolving form of war and national security situation, the basic point for 
PMS will be placed on winning informationized local wars, highlighting 
maritime military struggle and maritime PMS”.5 Furthermore, China 
seeks to expand its role in the maritime domain as the White Paper clearly 
states that the PLA Navy (PLAN) “will gradually shift its focus from 
‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ 
and ‘open seas protection’”6—making a shift from defence to offence. 
This strategic shift is witnessed in China’s increasing maritime activities 
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such as the setting up of a naval base at Djibouti and gaining an island 
at Maldives, along with access to ports such as Gwadar (Pakistan) and 
Hambantota (Sri Lanka), which are clear and unambiguous indicators 
of its intentions. In addition, the concept of maritime PMS is being 
addressed by increasing the PLAN’s capability in terms of its amphibious 
and marine forces strength; acquisition of a carrierborne aircraft and long 
range bomber and precision missile developments. Thereby, these factors 
quantify the changing nature of China’s strategy which is directly related 
to the growth of its military power.Hence, this four-fold assessment of 
China’s approach reflects the duality in its intentions and actions vis-à-vis 
its proposition.
Contexualising PLARF in China’s Dualist Approach
The reconstitution of the PLARF in 2015 as a military Service indicates 
the importance China puts on maintaining a modern missile force.In the 
words of Xi, the force is a “core of strategic deterrence, a strategic buttress 
to the country’s position as a major power, and a cornerstone on which to 
build national security”.7 Emphasising the “irreplaceable role” played by 
the PLARF in containing war threats, ensuring China’s strategic posture 
and maintaining global strategic balance and stability, Xi underlined the 
need to “increase its sense of crisis and strengthen its strategic ability” for 
the purpose of securing a safe strategic security environment for China.8
In this regard, the current agenda for China lies in enhancing its 
strategic containment capacity, combat preparedness and application 
of strategy. In doing so, the PLARF seeks to: strengthen the 
trustworthy and reliable nuclear deterrence and nuclear counter-attack 
capabilities; intensify the construction of medium and long range 
precision strike power, and, reinforce the strategic check-and-balance 
capability.9 This further explains that the role of China’s missile force 
has evolved significantly from being a nuclear deterrent force based 
on intermediate and medium-range missiles to becoming a force with 
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intercontinental- and medium-range capabilities, combined with a 
powerful conventional missile arm capable of conducting precision 
attacks at a medium range. 
What is noteworthy is that despite the PLARF being upgraded, the 
functional objectives of the missile force are still rooted in the directions 
of the erstwhile Second Artillery Force. This is exemplified in the 2015 
White Paper, which provides a three-fold perspective. That is, first, the aim 
of the PLARF is to transform itself in the direction of informationisation, 
press forward with independent innovations in weaponry and equipment 
by reliance on science and technology, enhance the safety, reliability 
and effectiveness of missile systems, and improve the force structure, 
featuring a combination of both nuclear and conventional capabilities.10 
In this regard, the PLARF will strengthen its capabilities for “strategic 
deterrence and nuclear counter-attack, and medium- and long-range 
precision strikes”.11
Secondly, the PLARF will act as the strategic cornerstone for 
safeguarding national sovereignty and security, wherein, China has 
pursued a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a 
self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature. China seeks 
to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level, as required for 
maintaining its national security. However, there is a clear proposition 
that China will optimise its nuclear force structure, improve strategic 
early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, 
and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or 
threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.
And, finally, the PLARF will continue to keep an appropriate level 
of vigilance in peace-time, which will perfect the “integrated, functional, 
agile and efficient operational duty system”.12
In this perspective, what demands attention is China’s “No 
First Use” (NFU) policy. As the 2015 White Paper notes, China will 
“unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
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nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear weapon-free zones, and will never 
enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country”.13 This statement, 
if analysed in the context of active defence and the above context, makes 
the NFU limited, and not applicable to states with nuclear weapons such 
as the US, Russia and India. That is, to explain that if active defence is 
seen at the operational and tactical levels, then it implies offensive actions 
by the nuclear forces. Given the lack of clarity, the 2018 US Department 
of Defence (DoD) report states, “There is some ambiguity, however, 
over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would no longer 
apply.” Some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out 
conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; 
for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival 
of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself. There has been no 
indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and 
caveats to China’s NFU policy. China’s lack of transparency regarding the 
scope and scale of its nuclear modernisation programme raises questions 
regarding its future intent. PLA writings express the value of a “launch on 
warning” nuclear posture, an approach to deterrence that uses heightened 
readiness, improved surveillance, and streamlined decision-making 
processes to enable a more rapid response to an enemy attack. These 
writings highlight the posture’s consistency with China’s nuclear “No 
First Use” policy, suggesting it may be an aspiration for China’s nuclear 
forces. To augment it further, China is working to develop a space-based 
early warning capability that could support this posture in the future. 
What is noteworthy is that China’s approach to nuclear deterrence 
and changes in its nuclear forces have not received much attention. It 
becomes imminent that developments in China’s nuclear deterrent should 
not be ignored, given that China’s nuclear weapons play an important 
role in the areas of potential conflict, which correlates to China’s actions 
to push its claims. The PLARF capability has allowed China to have a 
strategic advantage against its opponents. At the foremost, the PLARF 
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has supported the thought of providing a secure and favourable strategic 
posture: as the power of the PLARF and the reach of its missiles increases, 
China will be able to support power projection capability further from the 
mainland and deny access to the interventionary forces of other powers. 
The idea of containing “war threats” is reflected in greater capability of 
deterrence and to punish interventionary forces, if the situation demands. 
Strategic stability maintenance is seen by China in the inability of the US 
to prevent China from continuing the militarisation of the South China 
Sea at the expense of the smaller nations. 
Capabilities and Force Development
With the PLARF, the key query lies in understanding that if China adheres 
to its declared “no first use” policy and “self-defensive nuclear strategy”, 
then can its nuclear arsenal survive a first strike? The answer to which can 
be traced in the way China has successively modernised its rocket forces. 
Elevating the PLARF’s stature to that of a separate Service and given 
Xi’s emphasis on calling it the “core of strategic deterrence” significantly 
indicates the direction China seeks to take to propel its actions. That is, it 
is indicative of China’s willingness to invest in growth, modernisation and 
expansion of the rocket forces by strengthening capabilities, improving 
force structure, informationisation and innovation. This is evident in 
the PLARF’s growth in both strength and size in the past decade in all 
spheres: it holds approximately 1,800 missiles, both nuclear-tipped and 
conventional. More specifically, the 2018 US Department of Defence 
Report suggests the strength to be 1,491 to 1,930 missiles of various 
types and launchers of 456 to 585 different types.14 
Furthermore, in recent times, as China officially claims, the PLARF 
has strengthened its nuclear counter-attack and medium-long range 
precision strike capabilities with multiple new types of missile systems 
put into service.15 This claim was advanced with the induction of the 
DF-26 with a probable range of 4,000 km into the PLARF—deemed 
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to play an important role in the killer weapons of the PLA combat 
troops. In addition, the PLARF is heavily invested in modernising its 
nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-based Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBM) and adding more survivable, mobile delivery systems. 
As reported, China’s ICBM arsenal to date consists of approximately 
75-100 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A) and 
Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)-equipped 
Mod 3 (DF-5B); the solid-fuelled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 and 
2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the shorter range CSS-3 (DF-4). The 
CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most 
locations within the continental United States.16 China is also developing 
a new road-mobile ICBM, the CSS-X-20 (DF-41) capable of carrying 
MIRVs.17
In the event of the PLA’s 90th Anniversary Parade, China displayed, 
for the first time, two nuclear-capable ballistic missiles—the DF-26 
and DF-31AG—providing an insight on its future nuclear deterrent. 
The DF-26 is an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) which is 
capable of conducting conventional and nuclear precision strikes against 
ground targets.18 While the DF-31AG is a modified version of the DF-
31A road-mobile ICBM with the primary difference of the Transporter 
Erector Launcher (TEL) vehicle that transports and fires the missile. The 
upgrades indicate that the DF-31AG is capable of making off-road launch 
in most kinds of terrain, with a very short preparation time.19 With this, 
the PLARF now operates at least three types of ICBMs for its nuclear 
deterrence system: the DF-31A, DF-31AG and DF-5B.
In addition to the DF-31AG, another ground-to-ground missile 
that emerged for the first time at the parade was the DF-16G Medium-
Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). The DF-16, as China claims, features 
high accuracy, short preparation time, and an improved manoeuvrable 
terminal stage that can better infiltrate missile defence systems.20 Adding 
further to the inventory of short range missiles, China’s conventional 
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missile force includes the CSS-6 Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) 
with a range of 725-850 km; and the CSS-7 SRBM with a range of 300-
600 km. This force is complemented by road-mobile, solid fuelled CSS-5 
Mod 2 and Mod 6 (DF-21) MRBMs and DF-26 IRBMs for regional 
deterrence missions”.21 These are land-attack and anti-ship variants of 
the CSS-5 MRBM, and the conventionally-armed CSS-5 Mod 5 Anti-
Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) gives the PLA the capability to attack ships, 
including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. 
The DF-26, first fielded in 2016, is capable of conducting conventional 
and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets and conventional 
strikes against naval targets in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
and the South China Sea.22 China has developed cruise missiles in the 
air, land and sea variants, with ranges from 500 to 3000 km, with some 
of the cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads. The land version is the 
CJ-10, and the sea variants include the YJ-83 series, YJ-62 ASCMs, YJ-
18 (with a supersonic terminal sprint), the long range supersonic YJ-12 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) for the H-6 bomber. The air-launched 
Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) include the YJ-63, KD-88, and 
CJ-20 [the air-launched version of the CJ-10 Ground Launched Cruise 
Missile(GLCM)]. 23
In effect, China is also developing an effective class of SSBNs (Ship, 
Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear), as evident in China’s Jin-class SSBN, with 
four commissioned and at least one other under construction. The Jin-
class (Type 094), which carries the JL-2 Submarine-Launched Ballistic 
Missile (SLBM), marks China’s “first credible at-sea second-strike nuclear 
capability”.24 The construction of China’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN, 
reportedly to be armed with the follow-on JL-3 SLBM, likely is begin in 
the early 2020s. In addition, the PLAN’s nuclear arsenal comprises up to 
three Han-class (Type-091) SSNs(Nuclear Powered Attack Submarines), 
two Shang I-class (Type-093) SSNs, and up to four improved Shang II-
class (Type-093A) SSNs/SSGNs (Ship, Submarine, Guided, Nuclear).25
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China is working to develop ballistic missile defences consisting of 
kinetic-energy exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric interceptors. 
The media has confirmed China’s intent to move ahead with land- and 
sea-based mid-course missile defence capabilities. The HQ-19 mid-
course interceptor was undergoing tests in 2016 to verify its capability 
against 3,000-km class ballistic missiles, and an HQ-19 unit may have 
begun preliminary operations in western China. Indigenous radars, 
including the JY-27A and JL-1A – the latter advertised as capable of the 
precision tracking of multiple ballistic missiles – reportedly provide target 
detection for the system. China has fielded SA-20 PMU2 Surface-to-Air 
Missiles (SAMs) and future S-400 SAMs may have some capability to 
engage ballistic missiles, depending on the interceptors and supporting 
infrastructure.26 China is developing technologies that are necessary to 
counter ballistic missile defence systems, to include Manoeuvrable Reentry 
Vehicles (MaRVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and 
hypersonic glide vehicles. Deployment of more sophisticated Command 
and Control (C2) systems and refining C2 processes is in progress in 
view of the deployment of mobile ICBMs and future SSBN deterrence 
patrols.27
Given these developments in China’s nuclear arsenal, another 
significant development that adds to China’s growing capabilities is its 
development of space capability. As the 2015 White Paper reflects, “[o]
uter space has become a commanding height in international strategic 
competition. Countries concerned are developing their space forces and 
instruments, and the first signs of weaponisation of outer space have 
appeared. […]. China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, 
deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its 
space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and 
maintain outer space security”.28 The Congressional U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission reports of 2016 and 201729 have listed 
out the developments and progress by China in the fields of space support 
baLraJ sinGh naGaL
CLAWS Journal l Winter 2018 57
capabilities such as space-based communication; position, navigation, and 
timing; space-based Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); 
ballistic missile warning, space launch detection, and characterisation; and 
environmental monitoring, offensive systems such as direct-ascent anti 
satellite missiles, co-orbital systems, and ground-based directed energy 
weapons. China’s Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability is now well established. 
Its first ASAT test was conducted in May 2005, however, a 2007 test 
destroyed a redundant Feng Yun 1C weather satellite owned by China, 
leaving over 3,000 dangerous pieces of debris in space.30 The test was 
conducted in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), at 865 km above the Earth. A 
2013 test by Beijing involved its new missile, the DN-2 or Dong Neng-
2, and the test was conducted in “nearly geosynchronous orbit,” where 
most of the ISR satellites are located.31 While in October 2015, China 
tested the DN-3 exo-atmospheric vehicle, reported to be able to destroy 
US satellites.32 
Along with direct-ascent ASAT weapons, China is also believed to 
be developing other space weapons: in June 2016, China launched the 
Aolong-1 or Roaming Dragon spacecraft on a Long March 7 rocket, 
which is equipped with a robotic arm to remove large debris such as old 
satellites, and is a dual-use ASAT weapon.33 The Aolong-1 is believed 
to be the first in a series of spacecraft that will be tasked with collecting 
man-made space debris. Beijing’s recent space activities indicate that it 
is developing co-orbital anti-satellite systems to target US space assets. 
To note, co-orbital anti-satellite systems consist of a satellite armed with 
a weapon such as an “explosive charge, fragmentation device, kinetic 
energy weapon, laser, radio frequency weapon, jammer, or robotic 
arm”.34 In addition to the “hard-kill” methods, Beijing is also testing 
soft-kill methods to incapacitate enemy satellites. For instance, China 
has been acquiring a number of foreign and indigenous ground-based 
satellite jammers since the mid-2000s. These jammers are designed to 
disrupt an adversary’s communications with a satellite by overpowering 
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the signals being sent to or from it.35 The PLA can use these jammers to 
deny an adversary access to the Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
other satellite signals. Directed energy lasers are also a soft-kill method 
that could be used in an anti-satellite mission. China has been committing 
resources to the research and development for directed energy weapons 
since the 1990s.36
In view of these developments, it is to suggest that criticising others 
and following through with similar actions and programmes is indicative 
of China’s deceit and duality. China’s progress in the space domain is 
spectacular to say the least and now, with the creation of the PLA Strategic 
Support Force (PLASSF), the military-related space missions will get a 
boost in both the space support and offensive missions. 
Conclusion
Given this perspective, an analysis of China’s officially documented 
strategy and policy provides a clear and concise view of China’s future 
trajectory in international affairs and military strategy to support the 
enhanced and expansionist role that China visualises for itself in world 
affairs and regional dominance. China has asserted its claims in disputed 
areas by force and coercive actions, which run counter to the stated policy 
in the White Papers issued by the state. China also wishes to establish 
international rules and a world order on its own terms as articulated in 
the 2017 Asia-Pacific White Paper,37 as the present liberal world order 
does not comply with China’s political model. The revisionist approach 
of China is witnessed in the economic policies as demonstrated in the Belt 
Road Initiative (BRI). Financial and economic policies are being integrated 
into China’s overall strategic approach to world affairs. Its participation 
in regional and international security cooperation and maintenance of 
its regional and world peace role that China visualises for itself is a clear 
indication that military power will be used when required. Protection of 
overseas interests too will involve power projection and deployment of 
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maritime resources at various places in the world. The enhanced role in 
international affairs that China has articulated will see power projection 
into India’s maritime domain in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) under 
the garb of energy security, security of the Sea Lanes of Communication 
(SLOCs), military assistance to countries, humanitarian assistance or anti-
piracy operations.
The PLARF is being modernised, technically enhanced, qualitatively 
improved, structurally upgraded and quantitatively augmented for a 
role in containing war threats, ensuring China’s strategic posture and 
maintaining global strategic balance and stability. The PLARF is now 
capable of action in the conventional missions regionally upto 4,000 km 
and in nuclear missions across the globe. The A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area 
Denial) strategy is also effective regionally and, in the future, this reach 
may include the Indian Ocean besides the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. 
The PLARF is on the path laid down in the White Paper and directions 
given out by President Xi Jinping in the past three years, a modern and 
informatioanized capable missile force, ably supported by the space 
and cyber domains. The strategic direction to the PLA of “winning 
informationized local wars” refers to the periphery of China, and the 
disputes with India, Vietnam and Japan form the basis of the strategic 
directive. India, being one of the countries with territorial disputes with 
China, will do well not to trust China on published policies, and take 
appropriate actions to counter it on the violation of a rule-based world 
order, and coercion. The situation demands that India build capability 
and capacity to challenge China in case of a crisis or emergency, and 
work with other stakeholders to build partnerships to block its unilateral 
actions. 
China has articulated an offensive military strategy under the façade 
of strategic defence, India must understand the duplicity and pretense in 
the wording, and plan to undertake measures and a strategy to negate 
active defence. While trade and economic cooperation between India 
the draGon bares its fanGs
60  CLAWS Journal l Winter 2018
and China has increased and China has allowed India’s entry into the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), on the crucial entry to the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the UN Security Council, China 
remains staunchly opposed to India. In view of this, in the future, China 
will see India as a challenger and competitor in the regional context. This 
therefore, makes it imperative for India to prepare for the desired military 
capability for regional competition and dominance, if and when the need 
arises. 
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